Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with theft and was alleged to be a habitual offender. Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement, which provided that Defendant would plead guilty as charged and admit his status as a habitual offender. Accepting the parties' plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years for the theft conviction enhanced by three years for the habitual offender adjudication for a total executed term of six years. Defendant appealed, contending that his sentence was illegal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on grounds that under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant agreed that he waived his right to challenge the sentence on the basis that it was erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the waiver of the right to appeal contained in the plea agreement was unenforceable because the sentence imposed was contrary to law, and Defendant did not bargain for the sentence. View "Crider v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony armed robbery and felony criminal confinement. The trial court determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years on each count, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the aggravating factors used by the trial court in determining his sentence. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial court could not aggravate his sentence with an essential element of a charge that was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unless the evidence is forbidden by the terms of the plea agreement, the trial judge may consider all evidence properly before him. View "Bethea v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property, a felony. While serving her probation term, Defendant was arrested and charged with theft. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant had committed four probation violations, including commission of a new criminal offense, and ordered Defendant to serve a portion of her previously suspended sentence. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred by using the probable cause standard rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard in evaluating whether she committed the crime of theft. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the correct burden of proof for a trial court to apply in a probation revocation proceeding is the preponderance of the evidence standard; and (2) because it was unclear which standard the trial court used in this instance, the case was remanded for a new determination of whether Defendant violated the conditions of her probation by a preponderance of the evidence and, if so, the appropriate sanction for such a violation. View "Heaton v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor for vandalizing another man's truck. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty days executed, 150 days suspended, and 360 days of probation. The court of appeals (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction, concluding it was supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) reversed in part Defendant's sentence and remanded for a redetermination of Defendant's period of probation, not to exceed 185 days, finding that Defendant's sentence was inconsistent with Ind. Code 35-50-3-1(b). The Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the opinion below, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction; and (2) regardless of the maximum sentence available under Ind. Code. 35-50-3-2 through -4, the combined term of imprisonment and probation for a misdemeanor may not exceed one year. Remanded for imposition of a probationary period not to exceed 335 days - the difference between one year and the thirty days Defendant was ordered to serve in prison. View "Jennings v. State " on Justia Law

Defendant, a North Carolina resident, was charged in Indiana with two counts of non-support of a dependent. After the trial date was set, Defendant's public defender filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw after Defendant failed to appear for a hearing on the motion. Defendant subsequently failed to appear in court the morning of his trial date, so he was tried in absentia. A jury found him guilty on both counts. Defendant arrived at the courthouse that afternoon and was immediately taken into custody. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in trying Defendant in absentia, without counsel. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of burglary, adjudicated an habitual offender, and sentenced to twenty-two years imprisonment. The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $711.95, which reflected the loss of the victim's television set and record collection. The court of appeals reversed the restitution order on grounds there was insufficient evidence to support the amount awarded and declined to remand the case. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address whether the case could be remanded for a new restitution hearing. The Court granted transfer of jurisdiction and remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new restitution hearing at which the State would be permitted to present, and Defendant would be allowed to confront, any additional evidence supporting the victim's property loss. View "Iltzsch v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's wife died after various physicians failed to diagnose and treat her obstructed bowel. Plaintiff, acting individually and as a personal representative of his wife's estate, filed a medical malpractice complaint against Community Hospitals of Indiana, Inc. (Community). A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $8.5 million. Community subsequently made an oral motion to reduce the jury awarded to $1.23 million - the cap imposed by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (Act). Plaintiff objected to the reduction of the damage award alleging that the cap was unconstitutional and requesting an evidentiary hearing to develop his constitutional challenges. The trial court denied Plaintiff's request and entered judgment in the amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff forfeited his opportunity to conduct an evidentiary hearing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. View "Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Defendant pled guilty to child solicitation, a class D felony. Upon discharge from probation in 1999, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender for ten years pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act. In 2006, the legislature amended the Act to require lifetime registration in certain circumstances. Defendant's offense fell within these circumstances. After Defendant had completed ten years of registration, he requested the removal of his registration requirement. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case and as applied to Defendant, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibited retroactive application of the lifetime registration requirement. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of child molesting and sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty years. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to impose an aggregate term of forty years, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion sentencing Defendant. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the decision of the court of appeals, and summarily affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' decision concerning the majority of Defendant's claims. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court regarding Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Defendant's sentence. View "Kimbrough v. State" on Justia Law

After David Lawler obtained a civil judgment against Michael Kucholick's girlfriend for unpaid rent, Kucholick drove by Lawler's rural home and fired two shots into the home. Kucholick was found guilty of criminal recklessness and criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Kucholick to an enhanced term of seven years for criminal recklessness and six months for criminal mischief, to be served concurrently. Kucholick appealed, arguing in part that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The court of appeals concluded that Kucholick had met his burden of establishing that his sentence was inappropriate. The Supreme Court agreed and held that a modest sentence revision was warranted in this case. The Court then directed revision of Kucholick's aggregate sentence to an advisory term of four years, all executed. View "Kucholick v. State" on Justia Law