Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andrew McWhorter appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to a flawed voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and remanded the case for retrial. On transfer, the Supreme Court also reversed the judgment of the post-conviction court, but concluded that on remand, there was no prohibition for retrial on either voluntary manslaughter or reckless homicide. View "McWhorter v. Indiana" on Justia Law

The County Department of Child Services filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father to his child. At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the magistrate that presided over the hearing resigned her position before reporting recommended factual findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores. The case was subsequently transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley, who reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. Judge Moores approved the findings and conclusions and terminated Father’s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where a case is tried to a judge who resigns before determining the issues, a successor judge cannot decide the issues or enter findings without a trial de novo. Remanded. View "In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of I.P." on Justia Law

The County Department of Child Services filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Mother to her four children. The case was tried to a judge who resigned before reporting recommended findings and conclusions to Judge Marilyn Moores. The case was transferred to Magistrate Larry Bradley, who reviewed the hearing record and reported recommended findings and conclusions without holding a new evidentiary hearing. Judge Moores approved the findings and conclusions and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that, in accord with In re I.P., also decided today, the procedure used in this case violated Mother’s due process rights. Remanded. View "In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of S.B." on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped the vehicle Defendant was driving after observing the vehicle driving under the speed limit and coming to a full stop before turning onto a county road, where Defendant drove left of center. Defendant was subsequently charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.08 or more. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, taking judicial notice of the poor condition of the county’s roads, which required “evasive action” on the part of drivers. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that Defendant’s driving left of center did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop him. View "State v. Keck" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with four misdemeanors after a law enforcement officer stopped her vehicle for “unsafe lane movement,” conducted field sobriety tests on Defendant, which she failed, and discovered marijuana concealed in Defendant’s clothing. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that, while a video from the officer’s vehicle did not show Defendant’s vehicle leaving the roadway, it did show Defendant’s vehicle veering onto the white fog line, and to the extent the officer’s testimony conflicted with the video, the testimony was more reliable than the video. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s conduct was reasonable, and the stop was constitutional. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while suspended as a habitual traffic violator (HTV). Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging an underlying offense for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) on grounds of the trial judge's alleged impropriety and the alleged violation of his right to counsel. The post-conviction court vacated the OWI conviction based on impropriety on the part of the trial judge. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea because the OWI underlying offense had been set aside. The trial court granted the motion, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered Defendant's conviction expunged from his record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although a defendant who pleads guilty to driving while suspended as a HTV may not later challenge the plea contending that an underlying offense has been set aside on grounds of procedural error, the defendant may be entitled to relief where an underlying offense has been set aside on grounds of material error; and (2) the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the trial court clearly erred in granting Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.View "State v. Oney" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with felony rape and related charges. Petitioner's case was first tried to a jury in 2008. The jury deadlocked on Petitioner's charges for felony rape and felony confinement, and a retrial was scheduled. After a second bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty of felony rape and not guilty of criminal confinement. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and/or move for a dismissal of the rape charge on state double jeopardy grounds. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the "actual evidence" test announced in Richardson v. State is applicable to cases in which there has been an acquittal on one charge and retrial on another charge after a hung jury; and (2) the post-conviction court properly denied Petitioner's petition.View "Garrett v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony criminal deviate conduct in 1998, was released from prison in 2000, and began registering annually as a sex offender. Indiana later expanded its registration requirements. Defendant petitioned for relief from the additional SVP obligations, arguing that they were an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him. The trial court concluded in 2008 that retroactively classifying Defendant as an SVP under the expanded statutes would be unconstitutional. The State did not appeal the 2008 order, nor did the Department of Corrections (DOC) intervene to challenge it. In 2011, the State found Defendant had satisfied his registration obligations under the ten-year statute that existed at the time of his conviction. The DOC later filed a motion to correct error, arguing that Defendant's registration obligation from ten years to life was not an ex post facto violation. The trial court granted the motion and vacated the 2008 order. Defendant appealed, arguing that the 2008 order was res judicata against the DOC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the 2008 order was erroneous, it nevertheless became res judicata against the "State" - both the prosecutor and the DOC - when the State failed to appeal it.View "Becker v. State" on Justia Law

A driver hit Britney Meux, who later died from her injuries, and fled the scene. The State charged the alleged driver, Jason Cozmanoff, with thirteen crimes, including one count of reckless homicide. A few weeks later, Meux’s Estate sued Cozmanoff for wrongful death. The Estate then served Cozmanoff with discovery requests. If Cozmanoff were to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to comply with the Estate’s requests, the civil jury could infer he was liable for causing Meux’s death. But if he were to provide discovery responses, the State could use his testimony and responses against him in his criminal trial. Cozmanoff moved to stay the civil case pending the resolution of his criminal prosecution, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court granted a limited stay of discovery but ordered him to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a stay. View "Hardiman v. Cozmanoff" on Justia Law

I.T., who admitted to conduct that would be a Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult, was ordered by the trial court to undergo therapeutic polygraph examinations. During one of those exams, I.T. admitted to molesting two other children. Based on those statements, the State filed a new delinquency petition. I.T. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Juvenile Mental Health Statute, which bars a child’s statement to a mental health evaluator from being admitted into evidence to prove delinquency, barred the State’s evidence. The trial court granted the motion. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal a juvenile court order that suppresses evidence if doing so terminates the proceeding; and (2) the Statute’s limited immunity prohibits both use and derivative use of a juvenile’s statements to prove delinquency. View "State v. I.T." on Justia Law