Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother informed the Department of Child Services (DCS) that her son (Son) had been molested by her twelve-year-old nephew (Nephew). During a subsequent investigation, Nephew admitted to inappropriately touching Son and one of Mother's daughters (Daughter). Mother, however, was not informed of Nephew's molestation of Daughter. Nephew was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation, but Mother was not informed of Nephew's adjudication. Mother was later informed of Nephew's admission to the molestation of Daughter from a third party. Mother and Father (Plaintiffs) filed suit against DCS and the Evansville Police Department (EPD), alleging negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants on grounds of immunity. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed summary judgment in favor of EPD, holding that EPD was immune from Plaintiffs' claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (Act); but (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DCS, concluding that it was not immune under either the Act or the child abuse reporting statute. Remanded.View "F.D. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs." on Justia Law

After police officers received information about a drug dealer, the officers approached a vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger, ordered her outside the car, and handcuffed her. While Appellant was being interviewed, another officer began an inventory search of the vehicle and found cocaine. Appellant was charged with two drug-related felonies. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of her vehicle and the statements she made to the interviewing officer. The trial court denied the motion except as to the statements Appellant made before she received a Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Appellant or to search her vehicle; and (2) a reasonable person in Appellant's shoes would not have understood the Miranda warning to convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk, and therefore, Appellant's post-Miranda statements were inadmissible. Remanded.View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, a truck driver, was arrested after a deliberate action conducted by the state police uncovered nearly ninety pounds of cocaine in Defendant's cargo. Defendant requested a speedy trial, but the trial court was unable to bring him to trial within the time limit because of court congestion. Defendant filed a motion for discharge, which the trial court denied. Defendant also unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted of two counts of dealing in cocaine. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the admission of cocaine evidence at Defendant's trial and the denial of his motion for discharge, holding (1) neither the police officers' detentions of Defendant nor the collective police action constituted an unreasonable search or seizure; and (2) the trial court's decision to continue Defendant's trial beyond his seventy-day speedy trial window was not clearly erroneous.View "Austin v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-native English speaker, pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school. Ten years later, Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because the court-appointed interpreted failed to accurately translate Defendant’s Boykin rights. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that the advisement was defective but, nonetheless, Defendant knew at the time of the plea hearing that he was waiving his Boykin rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was not properly advised of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and did not understand his constitutional rights when he purportedly waived them. View "Ponce v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and class B felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF). Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the trial court should have given his tendered jury instruction on self-defense, and (2) the trial court erred by not completely bifurcating the trial on his SVF charge from the trial on his murder charge. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in utilizing the existing Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction on self-defense and in refusing to give Defendant's tendered jury instruction; and (2) in partially bifurcating the trial. View "Russell v. State" on Justia Law

After a detective received a tip that Defendant, who was African American, was responsible for a 2007 murder, the detective brought Defendant into an interrogation room to question him about the murder. In order to convince Defendant to admit his guilt, the detective implied during the interrogation that Defendant’s race precluded him from receiving a fair trial and an impartial jury. Defendant confessed to the murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement, claiming that it was involuntarily given. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in order to induce a confession, a police officer’s tactic of intentionally misleading a suspect as to his constitutionally guaranteed rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury, because of the suspect’s race, renders that confession involuntary. Remanded. View "Bond v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on several charges relating to his divorce case. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one felony count of intimidating the trial judge, two misdemeanor counts of intimidation involving the judge’s wife and a psychologist who was an expert witness in the divorce, and one felony count of attempted obstruction of justice relating to the psychologist. Defendant appealed on free speech grounds. The court of appeals reversed the misdemeanor-level intimidation convictions and affirmed the felony convictions. The Supreme Court granted transfer, affirmed Defendant’s convictions for intimidation of a judge and attempted obstruction of justice, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals on all other counts, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in its free speech analysis by failing to distinguish between Defendant’s attacks on his victims’ reputations, which are protected by the stringent actual malice standard, and Defendant’s true threats to the victims’ safety, which receive no such protection; but (2) there was ample evidence of true threats to support Defendant’s convictions for intimidating the judge and Defendant’s attempted obstruction of justice regarding the psychologist. View "Brewington v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and criminal gang activity. During trial, the trial court excused a juror from the jury after she disclosed that she had a frightening experience at her apartment and that she could not render an impartial verdict. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, concluding that the juror’s incident was unrelated to Defendant’s case and that the jury could remain impartial. The jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of murder and criminal gang activity. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, holding (1) defendants are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when they can show by a preponderance of the evidence that an unauthorized, extra-judicial contact or communication with jurors occurred and that the contact or communication pertained to the matter before the jury; and (2) Defendant in this case was not entitled to the presumption of prejudice because he failed to prove that the juror’s extraneous contact and communications related to his case. View "Ramirez v. State" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant was convicted of a sex crime against an adult female. In 2009, Appellant was released to statutorily mandated parole. The conditions of Appellant’s parole prohibited Appellant from having contact with children, even his own, and included a requirement that Appellant participate in, and successfully complete, a state treatment program for sex offenders. Appellant filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of those parole conditions. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant with respect to the conditions involving Appellant’s family but otherwise denied Appellant summary judgment on his other claims. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Parole Board conceded that it no longer sought to impose the parole conditions in a manner that would restrict Appellant’s relationships with his children and wife. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that some of Appellant’s parole conditions were impermissible, including the conditions that were aimed at restricting Appellant from being near or associating with children, as there was no evidence that Appellant was a threat to children; (2) found no fault with the remainder of the conditions; and (3) found no constitutional flaw in the state treatment program. View "Bleeke v. Lemmon" on Justia Law

Defendant was one of three men that police officers encountered in a self-storage facility and ordered to the ground. After questioning Defendant about the contents of the black bag he was carrying, Defendant admitted it contained marijuana. A subsequent search revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The officers then searched Defendant's car, which contained marijuana and equipment for manufacturing methamphetamine. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress his confession and the evidence found in the black bag and in his car. The court subsequently convicted Defendant of several drug-related offenses. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that Defendant's confession and the evidence leading to his conviction were fruits of an unlawful detention, as the officers' initial stop of Defendant and the subsequent warrantless search of Defendant's bag did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Remanded.View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law