Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary as a class C felony and theft as a class D felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address Defendant's argument that the trial court erred by admitting DNA evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting certain DNA evidence, as the Constitution does not require a laboratory technician involved in the chain of custody of DNA evidence to testify at trial in order to satisfy the demands of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. View "Speers v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor as class B felonies. The trial court sentenced Defendant to maximum consecutive terms after finding "substantial aggravating circumstances" and no mitigating circumstances. The court of appeals revised the sentence to concurrent terms of twenty years, finding that Defendant's forty-year sentence was not proportionate in comparison to Walker v. State and Harris v. State. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the sentence in this case was not inappropriate under Ind. R. App. 7(B) and did not warrant appellate revision. View "Chambers v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the murder of his mother. He was subsequently found guilty but mentally ill and ultimately sentenced to fifty-five years' incarceration. Defendant filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for, inter alia, failing to object to the trial court's tendered instruction on the penal consequences of verdicts for not responsible by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill. Defendant's petition was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington and therefore could not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim. View "Passwater v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped by a police officer due to his darkly-shaded tinted windows. The police officer smelled marijuana and subsequently searched Defendant's person, where he found cocaine. The State charged Defendant with felony possession of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to stop him and search his person. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that, although the tint of the windows on Defendant's car was within the statutorily defined limits, the officer's good faith subjective belief of Defendant's violation of a traffic law was enough to justify the initial stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion that the tint on Defendant's vehicle's windows was in violation of the window tint statute, and therefore, the initial stop was justified; (2) the officer had probable cause to search Defendant's person after smelling marijuana; and (3) because the search was legal, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. View "Sanders v. State" on Justia Law

After Defendant was charged with murder, he filed a motion seeking bail. At the same time, Defendant filed a motion seeking a declaration that Ind. Code 35-33-8-2(b), which assigns to a defendant charged with murder the burden of showing he is entitled to bail, is unconstitutional. The trial court denied Defendant bail. The Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional but nevertheless affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant charged with murder seeks bail, the burden must be placed on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant should be denied bail; but (2) under the circumstances presented in this case, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant bail. View "Fry v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder and assisting suicide. Defendant requested to speak to an attorney while in police custody, but the following afternoon, detectives re-read Defendant his Miranda rights, and Defendant confessed his role in his father's death without counsel present. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made to the detective in response to police inquiries. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the totality of the circumstances involving the content, place, and timing of the communication by the police with Defendant, notwithstanding Defendant's prior invocation of his right to counsel, constituted impermissible questioning or its functional equivalent. Remanded. View "Hartman v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of child molesting as class A felonies. The sentencing range for a class A felony is from twenty to fifty years, and the advisory sentence is thirty years. The trial court imposed consecutive advisory sentences for an aggregate term of sixty years. The court of appeals revised the sentences by ordering them to run concurrently pursuant to Ind. App. R. 7(B), thus reducing the aggregate term from sixty to thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the original sentence was not inappropriate under Rule 7(B) and did not warrant appellate revision. View "Merida v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted child molesting, a class A felony. The sentencing range for a class A felony is twenty to fifty years incarceration, and the advisory sentence is thirty years. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty years with five years suspended. The court of appeals revised the sentence to twenty years, the minimum term. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the sentence was not inappropriate under Ind. App. R. 7(B) and did not warrant appellate revision; and (2) summarily affirmed the court of appeals in all other respects. View "Lynch v. State" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury awarded John Doe $150,000 in punitive damages as part of a judgment in Doe's lawsuit against a priest for childhood sexual abuse. The priest moved to reduce the punitive damages pursuant to the statutory cap. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the State Constitution's separation of governmental powers provision and right to a jury trial in civil cases provision. The State subsequently intervened. In 2011, the trial court issued an order declaring that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the separation of powers and right to a jury trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutes did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Remanded with instructions to grant the priest's motion to reduce the punitive damages to the statutory maximum. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of child molestation. The only substantive evidence implicating him in those crimes was a forensic nurse examiner that testified about statements made by the alleged victim, a six-year-old child who, at the time of the trial, had recanted. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions with respect to two counts of child molestation, holding (1) there was an insufficient showing that the child victim in this case was motivated to provide truthful information to her nurse, and therefore, the nurse's testimony should not have been admitted as substantive evidence against Defendant; and (2) without this testimony, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to sustain his convictions for child molestation. Remanded for a new trial. View "VanPatten v. State" on Justia Law