Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder. At Defendant’s trial and during final instructions, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the crime of attempted murder. Although Defendant was not charged as an accomplice to attempted murder, and his attempted murder charge was not explicitly premised on a theory of accomplice liability, the trial court also instructed the jury on accomplice liability. During closing arguments, the State argued both direct liability and accomplice liability theories for the attempted murder. The verdict form also did not distinguish between Defendant’s potential direct liability or accomplice liability for the attempted murder. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it must find he had the specific intent to kill when he knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused another person to attempt murder. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving an instruction permitting the jury to convict Defendant of attempted murder as an accomplice without the specific intent to kill. View "Rosales v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was intoxicated when he crashed his vehicle into a service vehicle, killing the service truck driver. After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a manner endangering a person and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, but the jury deadlocked on the most serious of Defendant’s charges. Defendant moved for judgment on the verdicts. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to compel an entry of judgment on the verdicts and permitted the State to retry Defendant on all counts. After a second trial, the jury once again found Defendant guilty of the lesser offenses and also found Defendant guilty of the more serious offenses of causing death when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as class B and C felonies. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding (1) Defendant’s first deadlock on the most serious of his charges, paired with its finding of guilt as to the lesser offenses, did not equate to an implied acquittal of those more serious offenses; and (2) the prohibition against double jeopardy was not violated when Defendant was retried on the greater offenses upon which the jury was deadlocked. View "Cleary v. State" on Justia Law

Mrs. Bridgewater, a Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. (FACES) member parent, filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, alleging that FACES refused a reasonable accommodation for her allergic daughter by not serving her beef instead of chicken at a social event, therefore discriminating against her due to her disability. FACES subsequently expelled the Bridgewater family. Mrs. Bridgewater then filed a second complaint with the Commission, alleging that FACES unlawfully retaliated against her family for filing the disability discrimination claim. FACES filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the Commission did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because FACES was a religious organization, not an educational one. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Bridgewater on the retaliatory discrimination claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s final order, holding that the Commission lacked authority to take any action other than the dismissal of these claims because the incident giving rise to the claims was not related to education and was thus not within the Commission’s prerequisite statutory authority. Remanded to grant FACES’s motion to dismiss as to both claims. View "Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Soc’y, Inc. v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to deal in cocaine as a class B felony and sentenced to an executed term of sixteen years. After an unsuccessful appeal, Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. Still acting pro se, Appellant attempted to appeal the denial of his petition, but despite his “best efforts,” the appeal went awry. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals’ order. After full briefing on the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. View "Hollowell v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder, burglary resulting in serious bodily injury, aggravated battery, and battery. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in part, for counsel’s failure to object to a supplemental jury instruction on the definition of “intentionally” that was given after deliberations had begun. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instruction represented a correct statement of the law, and therefore, trial counsel in this case did not render ineffective assistance in failing to object to the instruction. View "Campbell v. State" on Justia Law

While responding to a report of dogs fighting in Defendant’s backyard, law enforcement officers entered Defendant’s house to retrieve one bloody and aggressive dog and to ensure no one was injured. Once inside the home, the officers found marijuana plants. Based on the evidence found in Defendant’s home, Defendant was charged with five Class D felonies. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his rights under the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and found him guilty of all charges. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Defendant’s home. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding that the officers’ entry into Defendant’s home was unreasonable and therefore impermissible under the Indiana Constitution, and therefore, the trial court erred by admitting the evidence recovered from Defendant’s home. View "Carpenter v. State" on Justia Law

The State filed a class C felony child molestation charge against Appellant, and 1,291 days elapsed before the beginning of Appellant’s trial. Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to six years executed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled discharge under Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C) and that the unduly long delay violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and ordered him released from incarceration, holding that despite the trial court’s technical compliance with Rule 4(c), the delay between the filing of the charge against Appellant and the beginning of Appellant’s trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Remanded. View "Logan v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of class B felony criminal confinement. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, Petitioner contended that had counsel presented Long v. State, he would not have been convicted of class B felony confinement or his conviction would have been set aside for insufficient evidence. The post-conviction court agreed with Petitioner and ordered his conviction reduced to a class D felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner mischaracterized Long, and accordingly, Petitioner’s counsels did not render ineffective assistance by failing to present an incorrect interpretation of case law. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers arrested Defendant on two counts of theft and seized his clothing, including his shoes, in accordance with their standard booking protocols. After police found what appeared to be blood under the laces of Defendant’s left shoe they subjected the shoe to laboratory testing. The testing revealed the presence of a murder victim’s DNA in that blood. Defendant was charged with murder and theft. Defendant moved to suppress the DNA evidence found on his shoe, arguing that the police should have obtained a separate warrant before subjecting the shoe to testing. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was subsequently convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that police need not obtain a warrant before subjecting lawfully seized evidence to laboratory testing even if that evidence is unrelated to the crime for which the defendant is in custody. View "Guilmette v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and of being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and in giving the jury an erroneous limiting instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by admitting certain photographs into evidence; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the introduction of testimony from a state witness; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of other crimes; and (4) although the trial court erred in giving a limiting instruction directed to the testimony of a witness, the error was not fundamental.View "Halliburton v. State" on Justia Law