Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Abigail Fricke filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which required her to disclose all her assets, including any lawsuits. Three years later, she filed a lawsuit against Red Lobster, alleging she was injured due to the restaurant's negligence. However, she did not update her bankruptcy asset schedule to include this lawsuit until after Red Lobster moved for summary judgment based on standing and judicial estoppel. The trial court denied Red Lobster's summary judgment motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.Red Lobster argued that Fricke lacked standing to sue because her personal injury claim was an asset that belonged to her bankruptcy estate rather than to her. The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Fricke had standing to sue because she alleged a demonstrable injury allegedly caused by Red Lobster. The court clarified that while Fricke was improperly pursuing the claim on her own behalf rather than on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, this meant she was not the real party in interest, not that she lacked standing.Red Lobster also argued that judicial estoppel barred Fricke's claim. The court disagreed, stating that judicial estoppel did not apply when the bankruptcy court permits a plaintiff-debtor to cure their omission by amending their asset schedule to include a previously omitted lawsuit. The court found that Fricke did not mislead the bankruptcy court and did not prevail on a position in her bankruptcy proceedings that contradicts her claim in this state court negligence action. Therefore, her representations to the bankruptcy court did not judicially estop her from pursuing her personal injury claim against Red Lobster. The court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Red Lobster Restaurants, LLC v. Fricke" on Justia Law

Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and listed an insurance policy with Northwestern Mutual as an asset on his bankruptcy schedules. Debtor claimed the policy’s entire cash surrender value as exempt property because his son (Son) was the beneficiary. The bankruptcy Trustee objected because Son was an adult and not “dependent upon” Debtor within the meaning of Ind. Code 27-1-12-14(e). That statute exempts life insurance policies from debtors’ bankruptcy estates when the named beneficiary is the “spouse, children, or any relative dependent upon” the debtor. Because bankruptcy courts in the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana had issued conflicting opinions about the proper interpretation of the statute, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether, under section 27-1-12-14(e), the phrase “dependent upon such person” modifies only “any relative” or modifies “spouse,” “children,” and “any relative.” The Court concluded that the phrase “dependent upon such person” does not modify “spouse” or “children,” but only “any relative” named as beneficiary of a life-insurance policy. View "In re Howell" on Justia Law

Loan borrowers entered into a residential mortgage loan. After a dispute about whether the borrowers paid the proper amount of property taxes, the mortgage holder filed a foreclosure action, alleging that the borrowers failed to pay monthly mortgage payments and fees. The borrowers asserted numerous legal defenses and claims against the mortgage holder and loan servicer. The borrowers asked for a jury trial on these defenses and claims, but the trial court denied the request, reasoning that foreclosure was an "essentially equitable" cause of action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the essential features of this case were not equitable. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the borrowers' request for a jury trial, holding that the borrowers' claims and defenses shall be tried in equity because the core legal questions presented by the borrowers' defenses and claims were significantly intertwined with the subject matter of the foreclosure action. View "Lucas v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law