Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Almost two million Indiana voters cast their ballots for Secretary of State in November 2010. The Indiana Democratic Party sought to have the winner in the election, Republican Charlie White, declared ineligible to assume office because he had not been registered to vote at the address at which he resided in July 15, 2010, the deadline for certifying candidates for state office. The Indiana Recount Commission dismissed the petition and later denied it. The circuit court reversed, directing that the Commission declare White ineligible. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and affirmed the Commission's dismissal, holding that the the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law because the Indiana Democratic Party's challenge was untimely. View "White v. Ind. Democratic Party" on Justia Law

Several hundred citizens of the Town of Fishers, including Plaintiffs, filed a petition with the Fishers Town Clerk seeking a referendum on whether the Town should convert itself from a town into a second class city. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution proposing a reorganization with Fall Creek Township that would merge the two entities into a reorganized city. Plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court, seeking to compel the Town Council to schedule their petition for a referendum. Thereafter, the Fishers Town Council and the Township held a public meeting during which both entities adopted the final reorganization plan. A referendum on the plan was scheduled for the November 2012 general election. The Town Council subsequently passed a resolution ordering a referendum on Plaintiffs' proposal in the general election. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, which the federal district court denied. The Supreme Court accepted certification to address a question of state law and held that a political unit may reorganize into a city under Indiana's Reorganization Act in a manner that eliminates voting rights recognized under Indiana law, including reorganization as a city with a council elected entirely at large and a mayor appointed by that council. View "Kole v. Faultless" on Justia Law

Insured held a life insurance policy issued as part of a federal employee benefit plan. When Insured divorced from his first wife, the divorce decree and property settlement required Insured (1) to maintain the life insurance policy, and (2) to designate the first wife and their grandchildren as equal beneficiaries. Subsequently, Insured remarried, designated his second wife as the sole beneficiary to the life insurance policy, and increased the insurance coverage. Insured and second wife later divorced. When Insured died, the second wife remained the sole beneficiary on the life insurance policy. The first wife and grandchildren filed suit, asserting equitable claims over the life insurance proceeds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the second wife, determining that federal employee benefit law preempted the equitable state law claims and that the policy proceeds accordingly belonged to the second wife. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act did not preempt the equitable claims and that the first wife and grandchildren were entitled to a constructive trust over at least a portion of the proceeds. Remanded. View "Hardy v. Hardy" on Justia Law

The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging T.N. was a child in need of services (CHINS) and requested that T.N. be removed from Father's care. Father objected to removal. A fact-finding hearing was subsequently held, at which time Mother notified the tribal court that she was prepared to make an admission to the CHINS allegations. Father objected. The tribal court told Father he could offer his objections at a contested dispositional hearing. The trial court then found T.N. to be a CHINS. Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding the trial court violated Father's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that for the reasons explained in In re K.D., also decided on this day, the trial court erred in not conducting a fact-finding hearing that was requested by Father, and thus, the court violated Father's due process rights. View "In re T.N." on Justia Law

Mother and Stepfather lived with Mother's two children. The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that K.D. and K.S. were children in need of services (CHINS). Mother admitted the children were CHINS, but Stepfather denied the allegations. After Stepfather requested a fact-finding hearing, the trial court converted the contested fact-finding hearing scheduled for Stepfather into a contested dispositional hearing. After the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found the children were in need of services. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Stepfather was denied due process by not receiving a fact-finding hearing. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and held that a parent who requests a contested fact-finding hearing has a due process right to that hearing, and whenever a trial court is confronted with one parent wishing to make an admission that a child is in need of services and the other parent wishing to deny the same, the trial court shall conduct a fact-finding hearing as to the entire matter. Remanded. View "In re K.D." on Justia Law

Appellant, R.L. Turner Corporation, filed suit against Appellee, the Town of Brownsburg. The court subsequently granted Appellee's petition for attorneys' fees. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant appealed, contending, principally, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order on fees because entering a final judgment terminates a trial court's jurisdiction and the order granting Appellee's motion to dismiss constituted a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in awarding the petition, and noting that jurisdictional concepts were the wrong analytical tool for determining whether an Indiana trial court's post-judgment action was a valid exercise of its authority. View "R.L. Turner Corp. v. Town of Brownsburg" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of State Revenue conducted an audit of a taxpayer corporation, concluded that the corporation's 2003 tax return did not fairly represent its income from Indiana sources, and proposed an assessment of additional tax liability. On the corporation's appeal of the Department's final determination, the Indiana tax court granted the corporation's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court incorrectly applied a combined scheme of tax statutes and trial rule requirements to the case before it. The Court concluded that the tax court required additional designated evidence, beyond the proposed assessment, in order for the Department to make a prima facie showing as to the absence of any issues of material fact under Ind. Trial R. 56(C). Remanded. View "Ind. Dep't of State Revenue v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found Keith Hoglund guilty of two counts of child molesting. The court of appeals affirmed. Hoglund appealed, contending the testimony of expert witnesses constituted impermissible vouching evidence. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) testimony amounting to the equivalent that a witness believes the child in a case involving child sex abuse allegations is telling the truth is inconsistent with the rules of evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony that commented on the child witness' truthfulness into evidence over Hoglund's objection; but (3) because Hoglund's conviction was supported by substantial independent evidence of his guilt, and because the improper admission of the evidence was cumulative of other evidence properly before the jury, the error in admitting the testimony was harmless. View "Hoglund v. State" on Justia Law

The City of Kokomo terminated the employment of Mark Thatcher, a police officer, after Thatcher sustained a knee injury in the line of duty. Thatcher was a member of the 1977 Fund, a disability and pension fund for police officers. Thatcher began receiving disability benefits subsequent to his injury. After Thatcher's knee was repaired, he sought reinstatement to active duty. The City decided not to reinstate Thatcher, who was fifty years of age and had completed four years of service in the police department, based on Ind. Code 36-8-4-7(a). Thatcher brought claims in federal district court against the City and Kokomo Police Department (KPD) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held that the City correctly determined that Thatcher was statutorily prohibited from returning to the KPD, as (1) section 36-8-4-7(a) applies to a member of the 1977 Fund who is receiving disability benefits and who has been determined to have been recovered; and (2) the time period during which a person receives disability benefits does not count toward "years of service" as that term is used in section 36-8-4-7(a). View "Thatcher v. City of Kokomo " on Justia Law