Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police responded to a domestic violence call involving the defendant after his girlfriend reported he had a firearm. Officers later found a purple handgun along the route the defendant had taken, and DNA evidence linked the gun to him. He was charged with felony domestic violence, misdemeanor unlawful carrying of a handgun, and felony unlawful carrying of a handgun by a felon with a prior conviction within the past fifteen years. The charging documents listed his two previous Texas felony convictions—one for Felon in Possession of a Weapon in 2014 and another for Aggravated Assault–Family Member in 2017—as the basis for the firearm charges.The Tippecanoe Superior Court dismissed both handgun-related charges, finding that the charging information was not sufficiently specific, did not constitute an offense, and that the statute used to enhance his charge was unconstitutionally vague under both federal and state constitutions. The trial court referenced an unrelated but identical dismissal for another defendant and issued a final judgment, allowing the State to appeal directly.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case under its mandatory jurisdiction following a trial court finding of unconstitutionality. The court held that the charging information for both the misdemeanor and felony handgun counts was sufficiently certain and constituted an offense under Indiana law, as it included the necessary elements and identified the prior convictions. The court further held that the trial court had misapplied the relevant statute and that the enhancement to a felony did not require the prior out-of-state conviction to be substantially similar to an Indiana offense, only that it was a felony within fifteen years. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of both handgun charges and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

A man was arrested in Indiana after his wife reported to police that he had a handgun in his backpack and a prior felony conviction. The State charged him with three offenses: felony domestic battery (not at issue here), misdemeanor unlawful carrying of a handgun as a person with a prior felony conviction, and felony unlawful carrying of a handgun, alleging that he had a felony conviction within the last 15 years. The charging documents referenced his 2016 Illinois felony conviction for Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon/Vehicle.The Tippecanoe Superior Court dismissed the two handgun charges. It found the information insufficiently certain because it did not specify the prior felony conviction’s statutory basis and concluded the charges did not constitute an offense. For the felony count, the court also held that Indiana’s reference statute, which allows consideration of out-of-state convictions, was unconstitutionally vague unless the out-of-state conviction was “substantially similar” to an Indiana crime. The trial court further speculated that the Indiana Supreme Court’s prior decision in State v. Hancock was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on direct appeal. It held that the charging information, when read with the probable cause affidavit, provided sufficient notice to the defendant of the nature of the charges and the underlying Illinois felony conviction. The Court clarified that Indiana’s statute prohibits handgun possession by anyone convicted of a felony, regardless of whether the conviction occurred in Indiana or another jurisdiction, and does not require a “substantially similar” analysis for general felony references. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the handgun charges and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Gomez" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three offenses: murder, felony murder (murder during a robbery), and robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. She pleaded guilty to all counts without any plea agreement. Both parties agreed that the murder and felony murder counts should be “merged” due to double jeopardy concerns, meaning a conviction would be entered only for murder. At sentencing, the prosecution agreed the felony murder conviction should be vacated, but the defendant argued the robbery conviction should also be vacated on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court ultimately entered convictions for murder and robbery, but not for felony murder.On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court relied on longstanding Indiana precedent that defendants who plead guilty cannot challenge the validity of their convictions on direct appeal, including on double jeopardy grounds. The court indicated that the defendant could seek post-conviction relief, but a direct appeal was not permitted.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reaffirmed the rule that a defendant who pleads guilty may not challenge their conviction through a direct appeal, even for double jeopardy claims. The Court clarified that defendants in this situation must first file a motion to withdraw their guilty plea as to the lesser included offense and request vacatur of that conviction. If the trial court denies the motion, the defendant may then directly appeal that denial. In this case, because the defendant did not file such a motion, the Supreme Court held that the robbery conviction could not be challenged on direct appeal and affirmed the lower court’s disposition regarding the sentence. View "Monroe v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

A corporation operating casinos in multiple states deducted both apportioned state income taxes and unapportioned wagering excise taxes on its federal tax returns. For Indiana tax years 2015–2017, it added back to its Indiana adjusted gross income the deduction for state-level apportioned net income taxes, as required by Indiana law, but did not add back approximately $2 billion in unapportioned wagering taxes paid to other states. The Indiana Department of State Revenue audited the corporation and determined it should also add back these wagering taxes, resulting in an additional tax assessment of nearly $8.75 million. The corporation protested, arguing the statute only required add-back of apportioned income taxes, not unapportioned excise taxes.The Indiana Department sustained the protest as to penalties but not as to the tax and interest, leading the corporation to appeal to the Indiana Tax Court. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Indiana Tax Court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding that precedent required the addition of wagering taxes to the tax base under both state and federal law.Upon review, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether Indiana Code section 6-3-1-3.5(b)(3) required the corporation to add back unapportioned wagering excise taxes. The Court held that the statute only requires add-back of direct income taxes and their functional equivalents—taxes subject to apportionment requirements under the federal constitution. It does not cover unapportioned excise taxes, such as the wagering taxes at issue, because they are not income taxes nor their functional equivalents. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the corporation. View "PENN Entertainment, Inc. v. Department Of State Revenue" on Justia Law

A county attorney sued the county auditor for defamation after the auditor made statements about the attorney’s professional conduct in emails and social media posts. After a five-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for the auditor, finding in his favor. The plaintiff then filed a motion to correct error, raising several arguments for a new trial, including that the jury was incorrectly instructed and that the court improperly excluded certain evidence. The trial court did not rule on the motion within thirty days, so under Indiana Trial Rule 53.3(A), the motion was deemed denied. However, the trial court subsequently belatedly granted the motion and ordered a new trial based on the jury instruction issue, then vacillated between rescinding and reinstating its order.Following these developments, the auditor appealed, arguing that the trial court’s belated order was void because the motion had already been deemed denied, and that the motion lacked merit. The attorney, still within his time to appeal the deemed denial, cross-appealed, raising not only the issues in his motion to correct error but also two additional evidentiary arguments. The Indiana Court of Appeals vacated the belated order, reinstated the jury verdict, and held that the attorney’s cross-appeal was limited to the issues raised in his motion to correct error.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that when a nonmovant appeals after a belated grant of a motion to correct error, and the movant’s deadline to appeal the deemed denial has not yet expired, the movant may cross-appeal any issues preserved in the trial court—not just those in the motion to correct error. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the additional cross-appeal issues, and otherwise affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "Stabosz v. Friedman" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours, a police officer in Indianapolis heard gunfire and observed muzzle flashes coming from a black truck driven by Facundo Ramos-Osario. The officer initiated a traffic stop, and another officer arrived to assist. Ramos-Osario, the driver, was removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, and subjected to sobriety tests, which indicated intoxication. He later consented to a chemical test confirming a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. Ramos-Osario was charged with operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .08 or more and operating while intoxicated, both as Class C misdemeanors.Before trial in Marion Superior Court, Ramos-Osario moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing it was unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution. After a suppression hearing, where the officer who conducted the stop testified about his observations, the magistrate found the stop constitutional and denied the motion. At Ramos-Osario’s bench trial, a different judge presided, and only the assisting officer testified. Ramos-Osario objected to the introduction of evidence from the stop, contending the State had not established reasonable suspicion at trial. The objections were overruled, and Ramos-Osario was convicted. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the State failed to establish the stop’s constitutionality at trial since the suppression hearing evidence was not incorporated.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the State is not required to prove constitutional compliance a second time at trial if it has already done so at a pretrial suppression hearing. The trial and appellate courts may consider both suppression hearing evidence and trial evidence when evaluating constitutional compliance. The Court affirmed Ramos-Osario’s conviction, finding the stop did not violate his state or federal constitutional rights. View "Ramos-Osario v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval to build a solar farm in Spencer County, Indiana, parts of which would be located both within the Town of Grandview and within its two-mile extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”) fringe. The Town of Grandview granted a special exception approval for the project, despite its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance only covering land within the town’s corporate limits and not properly providing for ETJ authority. Years later, landowners adjacent to the proposed solar farm challenged the Town’s approval, arguing it was void because the Town lacked authority over the ETJ at the time the approval was granted.Initially, Grandview Solar obtained approvals from both the Town and County, and invested millions into the project. When the Town later refused to issue an improvement location permit due to public opposition, Grandview Solar sued, leading to a preliminary injunction directing the Town to issue the permit. After settlement and dismissal of that suit, the landowners filed a new declaratory judgment complaint. The Spencer Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the Town and Grandview Solar. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the special exception approval was “ultra vires and void,” subject to collateral attack at any time.The Indiana Supreme Court, on transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the trial court. The Court held that the Town’s failure to properly provide for ETJ authority before granting the special exception rendered the approval voidable, not void. Because Indiana’s enabling statutes authorized the Town to provide for ETJ and grant special exceptions, any objections had to be raised within the statutory 30-day review window. The landowners’ late challenge constituted an impermissible collateral attack. The Court clarified that only actions truly outside statutory and ordinance authority are void and subject to collateral attack; errors within general authority are merely voidable. View "Wike v. Grandview Solar Project LLC" on Justia Law

In 1999, the defendant pleaded guilty to Class B felony child molesting after allegations that he engaged in sexual conduct with his ex-wife’s twelve-year-old niece. The trial court accepted his plea, sentenced him to ten years (with three years suspended), and required him to register as a sex offender for ten years, consistent with the law at the time. However, legislative amendments enacted shortly before sentencing created a new “sexually violent predator” (SVP) category, which eventually imposed lifetime registration on those convicted of certain offenses, including the defendant’s. Years later, the defendant was classified as an SVP “by operation of law,” without a court hearing or individualized determination.After completing his sentence and years of registration, the defendant petitioned the Lawrence Superior Court in 2024 for removal of his SVP status, citing compliance with registration, successful completion of therapy, a stable work history, and lack of subsequent offenses. The trial court denied the petition and, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to correct error, again denied relief, finding he remained a danger. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the opportunity to petition annually for reconsideration provided a meaningful review that satisfied constitutional requirements.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that the statute’s provision for annual petitions for review of SVP status precludes an ex post facto violation, as it ensures the opportunity for meaningful individualized review. The Court clarified that while expert evaluation is not always required, a hearing with expert testimony is necessary when the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of rehabilitation. In this case, the denial was affirmed because the defendant’s evidence did not meet that threshold. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

Catherine Adkins was convicted of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death after an infant in her care died from injuries consistent with inflicted blunt-force trauma. Although Adkins claimed the injuries were accidental, the autopsy indicated otherwise, and she received a thirty-year sentence with ten years suspended. Her conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Indiana Court of Appeals. Subsequently, Adkins filed a post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel regarding her jury-trial waiver. The State conceded procedural error but warned that new evidence could support a murder charge if she were retried.The Wayne Superior Court issued a declaratory judgment, ruling that Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, section 10—which prohibits imposing a more severe penalty than the original sentence if post-conviction relief is granted—does not apply when new evidence supports a higher charge. Adkins appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 1, section 10 neither limits the State's ability to file new charges nor restricts sentencing for those convictions within the statutory range.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on transfer. It held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s declaratory judgment was not a final judgment under Indiana law. Specifically, the judgment did not resolve all claims as to all parties, nor was it deemed final by statute or court rule. The Supreme Court clarified that not all declaratory judgments are categorically final and appealable. As a result, the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the appellate decision, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the Wayne Superior Court for further proceedings. View "Adkins v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who, in 2006, pleaded guilty to murder after shaking his six-week-old son, causing fatal injuries. The plea agreement included a provision in which the defendant expressly waived his right to appeal his sentence. The trial court accepted the plea and, after a sentencing hearing, imposed a sentence above the recommended amount, citing several aggravating factors, including the statutory aggravator for “shaken baby syndrome.” The defendant did not file a direct appeal at that time.In 2022, the defendant sought permission from the Elkhart Circuit Court to file a belated appeal, arguing that he had recently learned that an appeal waiver cannot bar a challenge to an illegal sentence. He asserted that the trial court had relied on improper aggravating factors and that his waiver should not preclude appellate review. The trial court denied the petition, finding the defendant was neither diligent nor without fault in his late filing and, more importantly, that the appeal waiver barred his claim under Indiana precedent. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defendant was diligent, without fault, and eligible for a belated appeal based on a prior appellate decision, but a dissent argued the waiver should bar the appeal.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case. It clarified that under Anderson v. State, a defendant is only eligible for a belated appeal if he would have had the right to bring a direct appeal, which, after a waiver, is limited to claims that the sentence is “illegal”—meaning outside the statutory range or unconstitutional. The Court found the defendant’s claims did not allege an “illegal” sentence and affirmed the trial court’s denial, but instructed that the dismissal be without prejudice. View "Ortiz v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law