Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In January 2024, seventeen-year-old B.H. was held at Logansport Juvenile Correctional Facility. After being informed of a minor sanction, B.H. allegedly threatened and struck an officer, causing a lacerated nose. B.H. later explained he was upset due to news about his parents. Three months later, after B.H. turned eighteen, the State sought approval to file a juvenile delinquency petition for battery on a public safety officer. The trial court denied the request, citing "LACK OF JURISDICTION." The State filed a motion to correct error, arguing the court had jurisdiction since B.H. was under twenty-one and the act occurred before he turned eighteen. The court denied the motion, stating the case was filed after B.H. turned eighteen.The State then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Indiana Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the trial court's decision, treating the order as a final judgment. The State missed the thirty-day deadline for filing its notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the appeal. B.H. petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted, vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction but focused on whether the State had the authority to appeal the order and whether the appeal was timely. The court concluded that the State forfeited its right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal and failed to present extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate that right. Consequently, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "State of Indiana v. BH" on Justia Law

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Franklyn Neter-Nu, a truck driver, visited Methodist Hospital in Gary, Indiana, complaining of nausea and vomiting. He was treated with IV fluids and medications, but the IV was twice found detached from his arm by Nurse Morgan Mittler, who then placed it in his right foot without proper training or a doctor's order. Neter-Nu later experienced pain in his foot, and despite an x-ray showing no issues, he was discharged. After traveling to Iowa, he sought emergency care for blackened toes and was eventually referred for a below-the-knee amputation.Neter-Nu filed a complaint against Dr. Zainab Abbas, Nurse Mittler, and Methodist Hospital, alleging negligence. A jury found in favor of Neter-Nu, awarding him $11,000,000, which was reduced to the statutory cap of $1,250,000. The trial court also awarded $79,993.40 in prejudgment interest. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, citing errors in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings, and remanded for a new trial.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and in its jury instructions, but these errors did not necessitate reversing the jury verdict due to joint-and-several liability. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the Providers’ proposed jury instructions on superseding cause and hindsight, nor in excluding certain medical records and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict but reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and recalculate prejudgment interest based on the Providers’ statutory liability. View "Abbas v. Bilal Neter-Nu" on Justia Law

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Connie Grabowski, a second-grade teacher for the South Bend Community School Corporation, was involved in an incident where a student, S.J., caused her to trip and fall. Grabowski filled out a worker’s compensation accident report form, naming S.J., who was the grandson of a school board member. Following this, the school conducted an investigation into Grabowski’s conduct, placed her on administrative leave, and offered her a last-chance agreement, which she declined, leading to her resignation.Grabowski filed a lawsuit for wrongful termination, alleging that the school retaliated against her for indicating an intent to file a worker’s compensation claim. The trial court denied the school’s motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of Grabowski, awarding her $600,000 in damages. The school appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment on the evidence.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was no evidence that the school discharged Grabowski solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. The court emphasized that Grabowski’s own theory of the case was that the school’s actions were motivated by the desire to protect the board member’s grandson, not solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. Therefore, the jury’s verdict could not stand, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the school corporation. View "South Bend Community School Corporation v. Grabowski" on Justia Law

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Chris Kelly was pulled over in August 2020 for minor traffic infractions, leading to the suspension of his driver's license. Despite efforts by a prosecutor to correct the record, Kelly was pulled over again in January 2021 for driving on a suspended license. He continued to face issues with his suspended license, which he claimed caused him to lose a job opportunity and incur over $1,000 in expenses. Kelly alleged that despite acknowledging the error, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) failed to correct his driving record.Kelly sued the BMV in January 2023 for negligently failing to correct his driving record, seeking costs, damages, and interest. The BMV moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the statutes did not create a private right of action. The Marion Superior Court granted the BMV's motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Kelly had sufficiently alleged a common-law negligence claim and that the relevant statute conferred a private right of action. The BMV petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that the Legislature did not intend to create a private right of action under the relevant statutes, as the material error review process and the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) provided independent enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, the court found that the BMV's duty to maintain driving records primarily served public safety rather than individual drivers. The court also concluded that Kelly failed to establish a common-law duty for the BMV to maintain accurate records. View "Kelly v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

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In the 2023 Republican primary election for the District 6 seat on the Columbus City Council, no candidate ran, prompting the Bartholomew County Republican Party to hold a caucus to select a nominee. Joseph Foyst was chosen, but Ross Thomas, the chairman of the Bartholomew County Democratic Party, sued for a declaratory judgment claiming the Republican Party missed the statutory deadline for choosing its nominee. The suit was unresolved before the election, which Foyst won. After the election, the Bartholomew Circuit Court denied Thomas’s claim, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Republican Party missed the deadline and declared Foyst’s candidacy void, instructing that Bryan Muñoz, the second-place finisher, be declared the winner.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and remanded to the circuit court to dismiss the case as moot. The court noted that the Indiana General Assembly created two distinct avenues for election disputes: pre-election candidacy challenges and post-election contests. Thomas did not file an election contest, which is the only statutory remedy for declaring the second-place finisher the winner when the first-place finisher’s nomination is invalid. Since Thomas only brought a pre-election challenge, his request to prohibit Foyst from appearing on the ballot became moot after the election occurred and Foyst appeared on the ballot.The Indiana Supreme Court held that Thomas must follow the statutory requirements for an election contest to set aside election results. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the General Assembly’s rules for challenging elections and concluded that Thomas’s failure to file an election contest rendered his claim moot. The court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Thomas v. Foyst" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law
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An adoptive mother, J.S., declined to take her teenage son, E.K., back into her home due to his history of violent behavior towards her and his siblings. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) sought a CHINS 1 adjudication, alleging that the mother failed to provide necessary shelter. At the fact-finding hearing, the mother requested alternative CHINS adjudications based on the child endangering himself or others (CHINS 6) or his fetal alcohol syndrome diagnosis (CHINS 10). The trial court deferred to DCS’s filing decision and entered a CHINS 1 adjudication.The Whitley Circuit Court initially awarded DCS emergency custody of E.K. and later adjudicated him under CHINS 1 after the father admitted to the allegations. The mother contested the CHINS 1 adjudication, leading to a fact-finding hearing. The trial court found that E.K. posed a danger to himself and others but still adjudicated him under CHINS 1, citing the mother’s refusal to provide necessary shelter. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the CHINS 1 adjudication, finding insufficient evidence that the mother either had the financial means to provide a safe home or failed to seek other reasonable means to do so. The court held that the trial court should have independently assessed whether a CHINS 6 or 10 adjudication was appropriate, rather than deferring to DCS. Due to procedural shortcomings, including the lack of proper notice and participation for E.K., the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "J.S. v. Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

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Gage Peters was convicted of criminal sexual abuse in Illinois in 2013, which required him to register as a sex offender for ten years. He moved to Indiana in 2016 and registered as required. In 2021, Peters vacationed in Florida, where he signed a form agreeing to lifetime registration as a sex offender. After returning to Illinois and then moving back to Indiana in 2022, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department informed him that he must register as a lifetime sex offender due to Florida's laws.The Hamilton Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, finding that Peters was required to register for life in Indiana because of his obligation in Florida. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, interpreting the relevant statute to require registration in Indiana for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations, regardless of the source of those obligations.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the statute applies to individuals with out-of-state registration obligations, regardless of the source. However, the court found that Peters is not currently required to register in Florida because his registration obligations there lapsed when he moved out of the state. Consequently, the court concluded that Peters does not need to register as a sex offender in Indiana. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Peters. View "Peters v. Quakenbush" on Justia Law

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EdgeRock Development, LLC developed a planned unit development in Westfield, Indiana, comprising retail and residential projects. EdgeRock contracted with C.H. Garmong & Son, Inc. and Fox Contractors Corp. to develop the lots. When EdgeRock fell behind on payments, Garmong and Fox recorded construction liens on all five lots, including those sold to ZPS Westfield, LLC and a nonparty. The contractors sued EdgeRock for breach of contract and sought to foreclose the liens.The Hamilton Superior Court awarded the contractors most of the relief they sought, including foreclosure of the construction liens. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the foreclosure, concluding the liens were overstated as they were not limited to debts for improvements directly benefiting the properties to which the liens attached.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case to address the validity and scope of the construction liens and the priority between the construction liens and First Bank Richmond’s mortgage lien. The court held that a construction lien secures only the debt for improvements directly benefiting the property to which the lien attaches. Therefore, the contractors can foreclose the liens on each property to recover only those amounts. The court also concluded that First Bank’s mortgage lien is senior to the construction liens for the amount loaned to satisfy Garmong’s prior construction lien but junior for the remaining amounts.The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment consistent with its opinion. The court also noted that its holdings do not disturb the in personam judgments against EdgeRock on Garmong’s and Fox’s breach-of-contract claims. View "Edgerock Development, LLC v. C.H. Garmong & Son Inc" on Justia Law

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Bernadette O’Malley purchased a used 2007 Dodge Caliber from Valpo Motors, Inc. in late 2019. Valpo provided O’Malley with a Buyers Guide stating the car was sold “AS IS” and a Sales Agreement that disclaimed all warranties unless a written warranty or service contract was extended within 90 days. O’Malley also purchased a Service Contract, which was noted in the Buyers Guide. The car broke down a month later, and a repair shop deemed it not worth repairing due to extensive mechanical issues. O’Malley’s son-in-law, Glenn Thomas, took the car to the shop. After Valpo refused to arbitrate, O’Malley sued for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). O’Malley passed away during the proceedings, and Thomas continued the case as the personal representative of her estate.The Porter Superior Court granted summary judgment for Valpo Motors, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Buyers Guide’s disclaimer of all warranties controlled over any contrary provisions in the Sales Agreement. The appellate court rejected Thomas’s argument that the handwritten note on the Buyers Guide negated the warranty disclaimer. Judge Felix dissented, arguing that the Sales Agreement’s specific terms should trump the Buyers Guide’s general terms and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Valpo’s opportunity to cure the breach.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Valpo did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability due to ambiguities in the Buyers Guide. The court found that fact issues remained regarding whether Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects. The court vacated the summary judgment for Valpo, directed the trial court to enter partial summary judgment for Thomas on the warranty-disclaimer issue, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure. If Thomas prevails, the trial court is to assess damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Thomas v. Valpo Motors Inc." on Justia Law

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In January 2023, J.F., a 39-year-old woman with a history of substance abuse, began experiencing severe delusions and paranoia, believing her parents wanted to kill her and her children. After a series of incidents, including living in her car and being admitted to the St. Vincent Stress Center, J.F. was temporarily committed by a trial court for up to ninety days due to her mental illness and inability to keep herself safe.J.F. appealed the commitment, arguing insufficient evidence supported the order. The Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal as moot, stating it did not present a novel issue or particularized harmful consequence. J.F. then petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court held that temporary commitment appeals are not moot upon expiration unless the appellee proves no collateral consequences exist. The court emphasized the significant liberty interests and lifelong collateral consequences involved in such commitments, warranting appellate review. The court found sufficient evidence to support J.F.'s commitment, noting her impaired reasoning, inability to function independently, and the danger she posed to herself. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's temporary commitment order. View "In re Commitment of J.F." on Justia Law