Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

For most of the first year of her life, B.C.H. remained in the primary care, custody and control of her maternal grandparents (Grandparents), and Mother would visit her once a week. Mother later married Stepfather, who petitioned to adopt B.C.H. The petition was granted. Grandparents filed a motion to reopen B.C.H.’s adoption and to intervene, arguing that, under Indiana’s adoption statutes, they had “lawful custody” of B.C.H. when Stepfather’s adoption petition was granted, so they were entitled to legal notice of and the opportunity to consent to the adoption. The superior court denied Grandparents’ motion for relief from judgment, determining that Grandparents did not have legal custody of B.C.H. at the time Stepfather filed the adoption petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the superior court, holding that Grandparents had lawful custody of B.C.H., and therefore, Grandparents were entitled to formal legal notice of the pending adoption and an opportunity to give or withhold their consent to Stepfather’s adoption of B.C.H. Remanded. View "In re Adoption of B.C.H." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under Indiana’s public intoxication statute of being intoxicated in a public place and engaging in annoying conduct. Defendant appealed, arguing that the term “annoys” in the public intoxication statute is unconstitutionally vague and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor public intoxication, holding (1) Indiana’s public intoxication statute is constitutional when a reasonableness standard is applied to the term “annoys”; and (2) in applying this reasonableness standard, there was insufficient evidence to sustain Defendant’s conviction for public intoxication. View "Morgan v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for being a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by admitting a detective’s testimony that out-of-court witnesses identified Defendant as the suspect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the testimony of the detective was inadmissible hearsay, and therefore, trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony, but the erroneous admission of the hearsay testimony was harmless; and (2) there was no material variance between the allegations against Defendant and the proof used to convict him. View "Blount v. State" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, they reached an agreement regarding child support that substantially deviated from what would be ordered by applying the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. Later, Mother petitioned to modify Father’s child support obligation. The trial court granted the motion and modified Father’s support requirements. Father appealed, arguing that agreed child support terms cannot be modified absent a substantial and continuing change in circumstances that renders those terms unreasonable. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, adopted the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that addresses the available grounds for modification, and summarily affirmed the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion addressing the trial court’s calculation of Father’s support obligation. View "Rolley v. Rolley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine, among other charges, and received an aggregate sentence of forty years. Defendant appealed his sentence under Ind. App. R. 7(B), arguing that his sentence was inappropriate given the nature of the offense and his character. The court of appeals ultimately determined that the sentence was appropriate. The Supreme Court concluded that, given the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant, Defendants’ sentence was inappropriate. Remanded to the trial court to impose a sentence of thirty years for dealing in methamphetamine. View "Parks v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent Mickey K. Weber, Judge of the Clarksville Town Court, pled guilty to criminal mischief in the second degree and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1 and 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and was aggravated by the fact that Respondent had previous legal issues related to alcohol abuse. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Commission) brought a judicial disciplinary action against Respondent based on his conduct. The Supreme Court reprimanded Judge Weber, ordered Respondent’s resignation from the Clarksville Town, and directed that Weber shall be ineligible for future judicial service until he successfully completes an approved treatment plan and two-year monitoring agreement approved by the Indiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. View "In re Hon. Mickey K. Weber" on Justia Law

N.E., the former foster parent of two minor children, filed petitions to adopt the children in Lake Superior Court 2, part of the court’s Civil Division. N.E., however, violated a local rule that all adoptions - a type of probate case - must be filed in the Juvenile Division. The trial court refused to transfer the cases to the Juvenile Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the local rule impermissibly expanded jurisdiction beyond statutory bounds and impermissibly impinged on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court’s “civil (including probate) division.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to transfer the adoptions to the Juvenile Division, as the local rule simply established venue and not jurisdiction and was binding on the court and litigants. View "In re Adoption of J.T.D." on Justia Law

Two landowners owned property served by a regional sewer district. The district had perfected liens against the properties due to the landowners’ failure to pay fees and penalties. The trial court listed the properties to be sold at a tax sale to satisfy obligations for the unpaid sewer bills. The landowners subsequently petitioned the circuit court to remove their properties from the tax sale list. The circuit court granted the petitions, concluding that because the district maintained the only lien, the district was precluded from foreclosing on the parcels pursuant to Ind. Code 13-26-14-4. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the foreclosure prohibition of Ind. Code 13-26-14-4, which governs the collection of regional sewer district sewer liens, does not apply to collection by tax sale; and (2) because the district did not seek collection of the landowners’ unpaid fees and penalties through the lien foreclosure method, but rather employed the tax sale method, the lien foreclosure prohibition clause did not apply. Remanded. View "In re Carroll County 2013 Tax Sale" on Justia Law