Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relators were magistrates in the Lake Superior Court, Juvenile Division. Respondents were the Lake Superior Court, Lake Circuit Court, and the courts' judges. Relators complained about a decision made by Respondents to allow Judge Nicholas Schiralli to be reassigned from the Superior Court's County Division to its Juvenile Division. Relators filed this action seeking a permanent writ of mandamus and prohibition, arguing that a transfer of the Judge to the Juvenile Division would violate Ind. Code 33-33-45-21(e). Relators requested a permanent writ (1) declaring that Judge Schiralli could not be reassigned to the Juvenile Division; and (2) ruling that no current judge of the Superior Court was eligible for transfer to the Juvenile Division. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the relief sought by Relators, holding (1) section 33-33-45-21(e) prevents Respondents from reassigning, transferring, or rotating Judge Schiralli from the County Division to the Juvenile Division; and (2) but this prohibition did not preclude the Judge from applying to be appointed, under the merit-selection process, to fill a vacancy in the other divisions of the court. View "State ex rel. Commons v. Lake Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of child molesting as class A felonies. The sentencing range for a class A felony is from twenty to fifty years, and the advisory sentence is thirty years. The trial court imposed consecutive advisory sentences for an aggregate term of sixty years. The court of appeals revised the sentences by ordering them to run concurrently pursuant to Ind. App. R. 7(B), thus reducing the aggregate term from sixty to thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the original sentence was not inappropriate under Rule 7(B) and did not warrant appellate revision. View "Merida v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted child molesting, a class A felony. The sentencing range for a class A felony is twenty to fifty years incarceration, and the advisory sentence is thirty years. The trial court imposed a sentence of forty years with five years suspended. The court of appeals revised the sentence to twenty years, the minimum term. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the sentence was not inappropriate under Ind. App. R. 7(B) and did not warrant appellate revision; and (2) summarily affirmed the court of appeals in all other respects. View "Lynch v. State" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury awarded John Doe $150,000 in punitive damages as part of a judgment in Doe's lawsuit against a priest for childhood sexual abuse. The priest moved to reduce the punitive damages pursuant to the statutory cap. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the State Constitution's separation of governmental powers provision and right to a jury trial in civil cases provision. The State subsequently intervened. In 2011, the trial court issued an order declaring that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the separation of powers and right to a jury trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutes did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Remanded with instructions to grant the priest's motion to reduce the punitive damages to the statutory maximum. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

Vincennes Indiana Girls, Inc. (VIG) deeded Camp Wildwood to the predecessor of Girl Scouts of Southern Illinois, Inc. (GSSI) on the condition that the property be used for scouting purposes for forty-nine years. The deed provided that ownership of the campground would revert to VIG if the scouting-use condition was breached during that time. After forty-four years, GSSI stopped using the camp as a Girl Scout facility and decided to sell. VIG sued to quiet title to Camp Wildwood and enjoin GSSI from selling the camp until the forty-nine-year period had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment quieting title in VIG. At issue on appeal was whether the forty-nine-year land use limitation was enforceable despite a subsequently enacted statute, Ind. Code 32-17-10-2, which purported to limit reversionary clauses in land transactions to a maximum of thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 32-17-10-2 was unconstitutional as applied retroactively to the land-use restriction in VIG's deed to GSSI. View "Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of child molestation. The only substantive evidence implicating him in those crimes was a forensic nurse examiner that testified about statements made by the alleged victim, a six-year-old child who, at the time of the trial, had recanted. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions with respect to two counts of child molestation, holding (1) there was an insufficient showing that the child victim in this case was motivated to provide truthful information to her nurse, and therefore, the nurse's testimony should not have been admitted as substantive evidence against Defendant; and (2) without this testimony, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to sustain his convictions for child molestation. Remanded for a new trial. View "VanPatten v. State" on Justia Law