Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Mother gave birth to an infant alone at home, Boyfriend took Mother and the infant to the hospital. Medical staff noticed puncture wounds on the infant's back and notified the authorities. An ensuing investigation resulted in the removal of the infant from Mother's care. The county prosecutor subsequently petitioned the trial court for subpoenas to compel Mother and Boyfriend to give testimony relating to the home birth of the infant. The trial court issued the subpoenas. Before Mother and Boyfriend testified, their attorney moved to quash the subpoenas pursuant to their rights against self-incrimination. The court granted the motion. The trial court then granted the prosecutor's petition for use immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor was not authorized to request a grant of use immunity; and (2) where, as here, no charges have been filed and no grand jury has been convened, a prosecutor may subpoena witnesses pursuant to Ind. Code 33-39-1-4, but if those witnesses invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination, the prosecutor cannot petition the court to grant them use immunity and compel them to testify without first filing charges or convening a grand jury. View "In re Prosecutor's Subpoena re S.H." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several Indiana taxpayers, brought an action challenging Indiana's statutory program for providing vouchers to eligible parents for their use in sending their children to private schools. Plaintiffs contended that the school voucher program violated three provisions of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court granted Defendant-intervenors' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the enacted program (1) was within the legislature's power under Ind. Const. art. VIII, 1 to provide for a general and uniform system of common schools; (2) did not violate Ind. Const. art. I, 6 by impermissibly providing direct benefits to religious institutions; and (3) did not contravene Ind. Const. art. I, 4 by requiring persons to support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against Plaintiffs' consent. View "Meredith v. Pence" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF) and sought to have Defendant's sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute. Defendant pled guilty to the SVF charge, and the case proceeded to trial on the habitual offender allegation. The jury found Defendant was a habitual offender, and the trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the thirty-year enhancement the trial court had imposed under the general habitual offender statute, concluding that it constituted an impermissible double enhancement because "a double enhancement is improper where the underlying conviction is for unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF." The Court subsequently granted rehearing and again affirmed that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to establish that the person was a serious violent felon. View "Dye v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with theft and was alleged to be a habitual offender. Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement, which provided that Defendant would plead guilty as charged and admit his status as a habitual offender. Accepting the parties' plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years for the theft conviction enhanced by three years for the habitual offender adjudication for a total executed term of six years. Defendant appealed, contending that his sentence was illegal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on grounds that under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant agreed that he waived his right to challenge the sentence on the basis that it was erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the waiver of the right to appeal contained in the plea agreement was unenforceable because the sentence imposed was contrary to law, and Defendant did not bargain for the sentence. View "Crider v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff successfully applied for employment at Labor Works, received job assignments an paychecks, and was never fired or laid off. Plaintiff later filed a class action lawsuit against Labor Works under the Indiana Wage Payment Act seeking to recover unpaid wages. Labor Works moved for summary judgment, arguing that day laborers like Plaintiff were involuntarily separated from the payroll at the end of every shift and thus were required to proceed under the Wage Claims Act. The trial court granted Labor Works's motion and dismissed Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of continuing to receive job assignments from Labor Works on the day she filed her claim, she was not separated from the payroll for the purpose of the Wage Claims Act, and therefore, Plaintiff could proceed with her claim under the Wage Payment Act. View "Walczak v. Labor Works - Fort Wayne LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to felony armed robbery and felony criminal confinement. The trial court determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years on each count, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the aggravating factors used by the trial court in determining his sentence. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial court could not aggravate his sentence with an essential element of a charge that was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unless the evidence is forbidden by the terms of the plea agreement, the trial judge may consider all evidence properly before him. View "Bethea v. State" on Justia Law

Child had contact with his paternal grandparents even after Mother married Stepfather. Later, Stepfather initiated a step-parent adoption of Child, and Mother curtailed the grandparent visits. Child's biological father (Father) contested the adoption, and Grandfather intervened in the proceedings to petition for a grandparent visitation order. The trial court granted Stepfather's adoption petition and granted Grandfather limited visitation of Child. The order also imposed no restrictions on Father's contact with Child. Mother appealed the visitation order. The Supreme Court remanded for new findings and conclusions, holding that the trial court's grandparent-visitation order was defective because it failed to (1) include findings that addressed four factors for balancing the parents' rights and the child's best interests and (2) limit the visitation award to an amount that did not substantially infringe on the parents' rights to control the upbringing of their children. View "K.J.R. v. M.A.B." on Justia Law

Motel was insured under a policy issued by Insurer. The policy provided coverage for, as well as a duty to defend against, claims for bodily injury and personal and advertising injury liability. The policy expressly disclaimed coverage for both bodily injury and personal and advertising injury when the injury arose out of intentional conduct. Specifically, the policy excluded coverage for harm resulting from acts of sexual molestation by motel employees. After an off-duty motel employee molested a young motel guest, Insurer sought a declaratory judgment to enforce its reading of the contract disclaiming coverage for, and its duty to defend against, a civil complaint brought by the motel guest. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the abuse/molestation exclusion excluded from coverage the act of the employee, as the victim was in the "care" of the motel at the time of the molestation per the language of the exclusion. View "Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. v. Amco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property, a felony. While serving her probation term, Defendant was arrested and charged with theft. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant had committed four probation violations, including commission of a new criminal offense, and ordered Defendant to serve a portion of her previously suspended sentence. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred by using the probable cause standard rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard in evaluating whether she committed the crime of theft. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the correct burden of proof for a trial court to apply in a probation revocation proceeding is the preponderance of the evidence standard; and (2) because it was unclear which standard the trial court used in this instance, the case was remanded for a new determination of whether Defendant violated the conditions of her probation by a preponderance of the evidence and, if so, the appropriate sanction for such a violation. View "Heaton v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Katherine and Michael, were living together in a home that was destroyed by a fire in 1998. Seeking to rebuild their home, Michael and Katherine completed an application for property insurance with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. American Family issued the policy. In 2003, Plaintiffs' garage was destroyed in a fire, and Plaintiffs filed a claim with American Family. During follow-up investigations, Michael disclosed the 1998 fire to American Family. American Family, treating the prior fire loss nondisclosure as a misrepresentation, voided the insurance policy ab initio and denied Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs filed suit against American Family claiming breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the grant of summary judgment on grounds that American Family failed to return the premiums paid by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' assignment of error was not properly before the Court on appeal. View "Dodd v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law