Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed a Marshall County Drainage Board order assessing him a portion of a drain-reconstruction project's costs, contending that he received no benefit from the project because his land was adequately drained before the reconstruction. The Supreme Court affirmed the assessment because under Indiana law, holding (1) Indiana law allows a drainage board to assess a benefit to a tract of land based solely on the fact that surface water from that land flows into the regulated drain for which the assessment is levied; and (2) as a result, the trial court's order - which found that the Board's decision to attribute a benefit to Petitioner on this bases was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful, and was supported by substantial evidence - was not erroneous. View "Crowel v. Marshall County Drainage Bd." on Justia Law

Parents of a young man killed in a helicopter accident in British Columbia appealed an Indiana trial court's dismissal of their complaint in favor of the Canadian forum, arguing that their claim should be tried in Indiana because they would only be entitled to nominal damages under British Columbia law. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment after adopting the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, holding that British Columbia provided an available and adequate forum under applicable law, and the trial court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens. View "Otieno v. Rolls-Royce Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle after having his license forfeited for life. On the same day, the trial court placed him on home detention under the supervision of a community-corrections program in January 2010. Defendant appealed, arguing that the introduction of certain hearsay evidence at the hearing revoking his community-corrections placement violated his due process right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the hearsay evidence introduced at the hearing was substantially trustworthy, and therefore, Defendant's due process right to confrontation was not violated by the admission of the evidence. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

Indiana's motor vehicle statutes provide a carve-out through which individuals whose driving privileges are suspended may still commute, provided the device they use to do so meets certain requirements. One requirement is that the maximum design speed of such a device may not exceed twenty-five miles per hour. Defendant in this case was charged with operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. The only evidence admitted at trial as to the above requirement was that Defendant was traveling forty-three miles per hour on a flat, dry surface. The trial court found Defendant guilty as charged and revoked his driving privileges for life. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme was not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) on the basis of a stipulation that Defendant was traveling forty-three miles per hour, and in the face of no rebuttal evidence, it was impossible to claim that no reasonable fact-finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had a maximum design speed in excess of twenty-five miles per hour. View "Lock v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal was the latest iteration of a decade-long dispute between the Miller Brewing Company and the Indiana Department of Revenue over Miller's Indiana adjusted gross income tax liability. The Department here appealed the tax court's determination that Miller owes no tax on certain sales to Indiana customers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the relevant statute was unambiguous; and (2) an example in the statute used by Miller in its argument was specifically designated as an example and not a rule and did not have the force of law, and therefore, the tax court erred in determining that the example operated to exempt Miler from liability for Indiana tax on income from sales of good delivered by common carrier to Indiana customers. View "Ind. Dep't of Revenue v. Miller Brewing Co." on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. The trial court placed Defendant on home detention under the supervision of a community-corrections program before a 2010 amendment to Ind. Code 35-38-2.6-6 took effect. Appellant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in not giving him good time credit for the time he spent on home detention pursuant to amended section 35-38-2.6-6. The court of appeals remanded to the trial court to determine Appellant's credit class for good time credit purposes during home detention, to calculate the good time credit to which Appellant was entitled, and to adjust his sentence accordingly. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) the amendment to section 35-38-2.6-6 applies to those who are placed on home detention on or after its effective date; and (2) Appellant was not eligible for good time credit. View "Cottingham v. State" on Justia Law

After an attempted escape from prison, Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping an officer, criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury, and attempted escape. The trial court an aggregate sentence of forty-seven years with three years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that the aggregate sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender under Appellate Rule 7(B). The court of appeals concluded Defendant had met his burden of establishing that the sentence was inappropriate and revised the sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's sentence was not inappropriate under Rule 7(B) and there was no abuse of discretion. View "Bushhorn v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved a trial court's discretion in granting a mistrial. Defendant vacillated throughout the trial seeking to proceed pro se and at other times wanting court-appointed counsel. Ultimately, the relationship between Defendant and his counsel reached its low point when later in the trial Defendant testified. Defendant complained to the jury about his counsel's trial strategy, and his response to counsel risked a mistrial. The judge then instructed Defendant to stop speaking and directed the jury to be removed from the courtroom. Before the jury left the courtroom, the judge directed the bailiff to cover Defendant's mouth so he would stop talking. Defendant later completed his direct and cross-examinations without incident. Only after Defendant completed his testimony did defense counsel move for a mistrial. The trial court refused to grant a mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not suffer actual harm from the bailiff restraining him, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. View "Vaughn v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Indiana Guest Statute (Statute), which prevents certain designated passengers from recovering damages for injuries resulting in ordinary negligence of the motor vehicle operator, where such passenger was "being transported without payment in or upon the motor vehicle." Son was traveling as a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by Father. When they arrived at their destination, Son exited the vehicle and began motioning for Father to drive forward into a parking space. Father then accidentally pinned Son between his vehicle and the next vehicle, resulting in injuries to Son. Son and his wife brought a damage action alleging negligence by Father. The trial court granted summary judgment to Father, finding that the Statute was applicable to the facts. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding that, as to injuries inflicted when a passenger has exited the vehicle and is standing outside of it and directing the driver's attempt to park, the passenger is not "in or upon" the vehicle and thus is not precluded from bringing a negligence action against the driver. View "Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary and was adjudged to be a habitual offender. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial judge granted Defendant's petition, reversed his conviction, and ordered a new trial. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial because of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and because of prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Hollin" on Justia Law