Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Steven and Lauren Siwinski, homeowners in the town of Ogden Dunes, rented their home despite receiving a cease and desist letter advising them that that rentals were prohibited by the town zoning ordinances. The town filed suit against the Siwinskis for violating town ordinances. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the town's motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the town in the amount of $40,000. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment in favor of the Siwinskis. On transfer, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the town, holding that the Siwinskis impermissibly rented their dwelling in violation of the town's ordinances. The Court then held that the fine for violating this ordinance should not have exceeded $32,500. Remanded. View "Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Donald Pierce was convicted of four counts of child molesting and adjudicated as a repeat sex offender. The trial court sentenced Pierce to four consecutive sentences for a total term of 124 years and enhanced the sentences by ten years for the repeat sex offender adjudication. Pierce appealed, raising several claims including the appropriateness of his sentence. The state cross-appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause with instructions to attach an additional fixed ten-year term to one of Pierce's felony sentences to an aggregate term of 134 years. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address Pierce's appropriateness claim. Based on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the Court revised the sentence to a total term of 80 years. Remanded. View "Pierce v. State" on Justia Law

Brenda Moore was convicted of public intoxication, a class B misdemeanor, after a public officer pulled over a car in which defendant was riding as a front seat passenger and found defendant had been drinking. A divided court of appeals reversed. On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction (1) violated public policy because she caused no harm or annoyance and wasn't driving while drinking; and (2) violated her right to consume alcoholic beverages. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding (1) whether conduct proscribed by criminal law should be excused under certain circumstances on grounds of public policy is a matter for legislative evaluation and not the courts; and (2) defendant's accountability under the public intoxication statute did not violate her personal liberty rights under the Indiana Constitution. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

Countrywide Home Loans, a mortgage holder on certain real estate, foreclosed its mortgage, took title to the property at a sheriff's sale, and then sold the property to a third party. Before these events, the property owners executed a promissory note in favor of Citizens State Bank. When the property owners failed to pay the note, Citizens Bank obtained a judgment in trial court, which was properly recorded. At the time Countrywide filed its foreclosure action, it did not name Citizens Bank as a party. After Countrywide discovered Citizens Bank's judgment lien on the property, Countrywide filed an action to foreclose any interest Citizen Bank may have had on the property. Citizens Bank filed a separate complaint seeking to foreclose its judgment lien. The trial court directed Citizens Bank to redeem Countrywide's mortgage or be barred from asserting its judgment lien. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court also reversed the judgment of the trial court but on different grounds, holding that because Citizen Bank's lien on the property was properly recorded and indexed and because Countrywide did not explain why the lien was overlooked, Countrywide failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to the remedy of strict foreclosure. View "Citizens State Bank of New Castle v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the placement of juvenile A.B., who was being detained at a juvenile center. The juvenile court concluded that A.B. be placed out of state at Canyon State Academy where A.B. could learn to be independent. The Department of Child Services (DCS) overruled the decision, requiring A.B. to be placed at one of several facilities in Indiana. The trial court entered an order of modification, finding that three sections of the Indiana Code allowing the director of DCS to supplant the juvenile court judge in making dispositional decrees affecting children under his jurisdiction were unconstitutional. DCS appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order regarding the constitutionality of the statues, holding that the three statutes do not violate the separation of powers provision of the Indiana constitution. The Court then held that the DCS requirement that A.B. be placed in Indiana rather than out of state at Canyon State Academy was arbitrary and capricious, upheld the trial court's placement of A.B. at Canyon State Academy, and ordered DCS to pay for the placement. View "A.B. v. State" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to child molesting, defendant Michael Harris was sentenced to a prison term of ten years and was required to register on the sex offender list for ten years following his release. Prior to his release, the Department of Correction (DOC) notified Harris that he was required to register as a sexually violent predator (SVP) with local law enforcement for his lifetime. Harris filed a complaint in the circuit court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the DOC, arguing that the DOC lacked the authority to make an SVP determination. The trial court granted Harris relief, thereby removing his SVP status. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the DOC was not authorized by statute to determine Harris's status as an SVP and that his status did not change by operation of law under an amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that Harris's status in fact changed by operation of law and that this change did not violate Indiana's prohibition on ex post facto laws or doctrine of separation of powers. View "Lemmon v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant Randy Horton was convicted of nine counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an executed term of 324 years in prison. Horton appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence at trial. Horton also appealed his sentence on grounds that it constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion to sentence him to such a lengthy term and that the term was inappropriately long given his character and the nature of his offenses. The court of appeals rejected these claims and affirmed in all respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court revised Horton's sentence to an aggregate executed term of 110 years, finding that Horton's lack of any other adult criminal history, coupled with the fact that his only juvenile adjudication was for truancy, warranted credit as a mitigating circumstance. Remanded. View "Horton v. State" on Justia Law

On the day W.H. was born, seventeen-year-old J.M. signed an affidavit of paternity acknowledging W.H. was his child. More than a decade later county prosecutors sought a support order on behalf of the child's mother. J.M. filed a motion to set aside the paternity affidavit, which the trial court denied, holding his absence at a previous child support hearing ratified his signing of the affidavit. On appeal, the court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion in denying J.M.'s motion and concluded that a material mistake of fact existed at the time J.M. executed the paternity affidavit. The court directed that the paternity affidavit be set aside and vacated the trial court's order adjudicating J.M. as the legal father and the order of support. On transfer, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision as to paternity and remanded the case to give J.M. the opportunity to challenge the paternity affidavit in the manner outlined in Ind. Code 16-37-2-2(h). View "J.M. v. M.A." on Justia Law

After being charged with two counts of child molesting, defendant Ronald Fromme asked the circuit court to require Crisis Connection, an organization that provides services to victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence, to provide him with all of its records relating to the alleged victims. Crisis Connection argued that the state victim advocate privilege gave it authority to refuse the request. The circuit court ordered Crisis Connection to deliver the records to the court for its in camera review before turning them over to Fromme. Upon review, the court of appeals concluded that he privacy interest asserted by Crisis Connection was not strong enough to bar the in camera review. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the appellate court and reversed the order of the trial court, holding the state's compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information gathered in the course of serving the needs of victims of violence and abuse was not outweighed by Fromme's right to present a complete defense. Accordingly, Fromme did not have a constitutional right to an in camera review of the records. In the absence of a violation of Fromme's constitutional rights, the Court applied the victim advocate privilege. View "Crisis Connection, Inc. v. Fromme" on Justia Law

Appellant Lamar Crawford was convicted of murder. Prior to his trial, a television production company called Lucky Shift, Inc. filmed aspects of Crawford's murder investigation and interviewed people involved. Crawford requested an order for the trial court directing Lucky Shift to produce the footage. The trial court ordered many items requested by Crawford be disclosed for an in camera review but denied three of Crawford's requests because they were not particular enough. Appellant appealed the denial. The court of appeals affirmed the ruling that the three requests were not sufficiently particular under the three-step test used to determine the discoverability of information not otherwise protected by privilege in criminal cases set forth in State v. Cline. On transfer, the Supreme Court repeated the three-step test and found that Crawford's requests were not made with sufficient particularity. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Crawford v. State" on Justia Law