Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant-Plaintiff Bradley Love was a volunteer and part-time firefighter for the Sugar Creek Township Fire Department (Department) during the spring of 2006. During the Republican primary election that spring, Bob Boyer, a retired volunteer firefighter, challenged the incumbent, C.O. Montgomery, for the office of Sugar Creek Township Trustee. One of the Trusteeâs principal duties is to appoint a fire chief to oversee the Department. On April 24, 2006, a few weeks before the May 2nd primary, an email concerning Boyerâs political intentions was forwarded to Appellant by an acquaintance. Eventually a copy of Appellantâs email made its way to Appellee-Defendant Fire Chief Robert Rehfus. After consulting with Township counsel, Appellee sought to verify whether some of the facts in the email were true. Appellee was particularly offended by parts of the email. Concluding that Appellant made some false statements in the email, Appellee terminated Appellantâs employment for conduct unbecoming a firefighter and failing to be truthful in accordance with the Departmentâs General Orders. Appellant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Hancock Circuit Court against both the Chief and the Township for violation of his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment arguing both that Appellantâs constitutional rights were not violated because false statements are not protected, and that the Township could not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. The trial court entered summary judgment on behalf of Appellees on both grounds. The appellate court reversed, finding that Appellantâs speech was protected under the First Amendment and that the Township was subject to liability under § 1983 because the Chief established final government policy respecting employment decisions within the fire department. The Supreme Court on review affirmed the appellate court decision, finding that the email was constitutionally protected speech, and that there were genuine issues of material fact that needed to be resolved in order to determine whether, as a matter of state law, the township is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the Chiefâs actions.

Appellant George Janiec, a Republican Party candidate for Mayor of the City of Hammond and an incumbent member of the Hammond School Board, was removed from the May 3, 2011 primary election ballot by Appellee Lake County Board of Election and Registration. Appellant challenged the Boardâs decision in Lake Superior Court, requesting judicial review and injunctive relief. The trial court found in favor of the Board. Appellant appealed the trial courtâs decision and sought immediate transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Board and Lake Superior Court held that Appellantâs candidacy was inconsistent with the ethical policies applicable to members of the Hammond School Board. The Supreme Court found no basis in statute or law for disqualifying Appellant on this basis, and enjoined the Board from removing Appellantâs name from the ballot in the May 2011 primary election.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) randomly allocated championship tickets to applicants who had offered to purchase tickets by submitting the face value of the tickets along with a non-refundable handling fee. The face-value amount (but not the handling fee) was refunded to applicants whose offers were not accepted. Plaintiffs in this case submitted offers to the NCAA to purchase tickets for the NCAA Division I men's basketball tournament, but their offers were not accepted. Dissatisfied with not being able to purchase tickets, the plaintiffs filed suit against the NCAA in federal court, alleging several claims, the underlying basis being that the NCAA's ticket-distribution system constituted an unlawful lottery under state law. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that even if the NCAA was operating an illegal lottery, plaintiffs' claims were barred by in pari delicto because they were willing participants in it. On appeal, the majority of the appellate panel held that the ticket-distribution process was a lottery, and the in pari delicto defense was not available because the NCAA had a greater degree of fault than the plaintiffs. The NCAA appealed the decision, and the same appellate panel vacated its prior decision. Pursuant to state appellate procedure, the panel presented certified questions for Supreme Court consideration, in particular, whether the NCAA's ticket distribution process was an unlawful lottery. The Court found that state law does not define "lottery," and following its holding in Tinder, defined the term as "a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance among those who provided ⦠consideration." The Court found that the NCAA distribution scheme does not fall within definition, and is not an unlawful lottery under state law.